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AMERICAN INNOCENCE
Robert N. Strassfeld I
"[I]t is unpleasant for Americans to see that some citizens, some soldiers
have acted this way, because.., it doesn't reflect how we think. This is not
America. "I
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would not admit of tor-
tures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce
the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They
may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-of torturing,
to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might as well
draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will
tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of govern-
ment, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by tor-
ture .... We are then lost and undone. 
2
I. INTRODUCTION
One of my earliest enduring memories of the Vietnam War is of tor-
ture. Thankfully, my memories come not from first-hand experiences, but
from a photo essay published by Life Magazine in June 1964. Nevertheless,
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My thanks to Beth
Hillman, George Herring, Hiram Chodosh, Amos Guiora, and Ted Steinberg for helpful
suggestions regarding this project. None of them have read a draft, so they really are blame-
less for any errors contained herein. My thanks also to Case School of Law for summer re-
search support and to the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center for sponsoring the
symposium on "Torture and the War on Terror" of which this is a part. For valuable research
assistance I thank Christopher Borm and Victoria Marquard. I am also grateful for some
translation help given to me by Takahiko Shibayama. I am deeply indebted to Spence Zaor-
ski for his translation of the section of Akihiko Okamura's book on Vietnam that deals with
the events described in the Introduction to this article. I am especially grateful to Ms. Masako
Okamura for her gracious efforts to find any of her brother-in-law Akihiko Okamura's un-
published photographs that might shed light on the incident described in his Life Magazine
photo essay. This article is dedicated to the memory of Marla Ruzicka and Akihiko Okamura
who risked so much, and in Maria Ruzicka's case made the ultimate sacrifice, to tell the truth
about war.
1 Interview by Alhurra Television with President George W. Bush, 40 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 786, 787 (May 10, 2004), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?db
name=2004_presidentialdocuments&docid=pdl Omy04_txt-20.pdf.
2 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787 447-48 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1941) (1836) [hereinafter DEBATES] (quoting
Patrick Henry).
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the pictures and text produced memories that are vivid, powerful, and last-
ing. Under what would prove to be an overly optimistic title, A Little War,
Far Away-And Very Ugly, the text and photographs presented a grim pic-
ture.3 Japanese photojournalist Akihiko Okamura was unflinching in his
depiction of the misery and death that he saw.
A portion of the essay involved a combat mission of a South Viet-
namese ("Army of the Republican of Viet Nam" or "ARVN") military unit
near the Cambodian border. After a helicopter bombardment of a South
Vietnamese village, the ARVN soldiers were airlifted to the village, where
they met no resistance.4 Initially finding only women, children, and older
men, they eventually flushed out forty-three military-aged men, whom they
assumed to be guerillas. Over Okamura's protests, hours of interrogation
followed.6 The text and Okamura's photographs depict ARVN soldiers
beating and kicking the "guerillas." 7 They placed the prisoners in uncom-
fortable stress positions: they were "jackknifed into positions of agony." 8
The ARVN soldiers also employed various water torture techniques. They
held prisoners under water in the nearby river, or put rags on the prisoners'
faces and then poured water on the rags to create the sensation of drown-
ing.9 Elsewhere Okamura described the torture in greater detail and the ac-
count is, as one would expect, chilling and disturbing.' 0 Okamura did not
3 A Little War, Far Away--And Very Ugly, LIFE, June 12, 1964, at 34 [hereinafter LIFE]
(photographed by Akihiko Okamura).
4 Id. at 39.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
1o See AKIHIKO OKAMURA, MINAMI VETONAMU SENSO JUGUNKI: ZEN (1990) (Japan).
Okamura recounts, for instance:
Drenched clothes cling to the body of a young peasant villager of only 18 or 19
years-old who has been forced down to the ground and is lying face up with his
hands bound behind his back. He can't breathe. His nose and mouth twitch convul-
sively under a cloth gag. A government soldier trickles water over his face. A
strained scream comes from deep within the villager's throat as he struggles to
move his lower body to escape the life-threatening torture with his legs kicking
towards the upper body of the soldier. "He's a big one! Hold him down. He's too
strong for us. Use the pole to choke him!" An officer standing next to them with a
military map in his left hand and a bamboo cane in his right hand gives detailed or-
ders. This Catholic captain, who came from the North to the South after the Ge-
neva Accords were signed, maintains a stoic expression on his face while looking
down at his captured prey ....
The torture continues for over an hour under the broiling sun. An experienced non-
commissioned officer squats down near the ear of the villager who can hardly
breathe. The villager's face is hidden by the cloth covering it. I wonder how the
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have the benefit of the Bybee Memorandum," of recent U.S. Department of
Defense memoranda delineating permissible interrogation techniques, 12 nor
of Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") Director Porter Goss' assurance that
such techniques are merely "professional interrogation."' 3 Thus unenlight-
ened, Okamura had no trouble recognizing the acts he photographed as "tor-
ture."'
14
As a nine-year old, waiting in my pediatrician's office for an allergy
shot to help me cope with asthma, I focused especially on the water torture.
I understood the panic that comes with the struggle to catch an adequate
villager feels as he listens to the officer. "Come on, tell us. Where are the weapons
hidden? Who is the Vietcong contact for this village?" However, the villager re-
mains silent. He replies by wriggling his body and trying to kick the soldiers.
"Damn it! Arrgh!" Six soldiers spring like locusts and pin the villager down by his
arms and legs. A pole that has been brought over is placed over the villager's soft
throat. The officer gives an ultimatum to the villager, "Okay, if you don't talk,
you're going to die!" Unable to bear any more, the villager's mother, who had been
praying for her son in her home next door, rushes barefoot out to where her son is.
A soldier holding a gun instantly responds and pushes the frail woman back into a
comer of her home.
Id. Spence Zaorski provided an English translation of a portion of Okamura's Japanese book
especially for this article.
11 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND
TRUTH: AMERICA, ABu GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 115, 117-26 (2004) [hereinafter
Bybee Memorandum].
12 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, Dir, J2 to Michael E. Dunlavey, Commander, Joint
Task Force 170, U.S. Dep't of Def., Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies
(Oct. 11, 2001), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 167 (approving the "use of stress
positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours" and limiting, but not absolutely
prohibiting the "[u]se of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suf-
focation"); Memorandum from Diane E. Beaver, Staff Judge Advocate to Michael E.
Dunlavey, Commander, Joint Task Force 170, U.S. Dep't of Def., Legal Brief on Proposed
Counter-Resistance Strategies (Oct. 11, 2001), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 170,
176-7 ("The use of a wet towel to induce the misperception of suffocation would also be
permissible if not done with the specific intent to cause prolonged mental harm, and absent
medical evidence that it would."); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Def. to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Counter-
Resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 11, at 181 (rec-
ommending that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approve the use of various interro-
gation techniques including stress positions, though not simulated suffocation with wet tow-
els). A reproduction of the Haynes memorandum, with Rumsfeld's approval and comment
that "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?" is available at,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/etn/pdf/dod-memos-120202.pdf (last visited Mar.
23, 2006).
13 Douglas Jehl, Questions Left By C.LA. Chief on Torture Use, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2005, at Al.
14 LIFE, supra note 3, at 38-39.
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breath. Upon recently returning to the photographs, I find myself wondering
about two questions that escaped my attention at the time. First, why was
there no strong reaction to these photographs? There was hardly a ripple in
the letters to the editor section in the weeks that followed. Second, and more
important, though, perhaps, related, where are the Americans?
May 1964, when the mission depicted occurred, was during what
has come to be known as the advisory period of the war. America's military
presence in South Vietnam was still relatively small. Officially, our in-
volvement was limited largely to the assistance of American advisors at-
tached to the ARVN forces.' 5 Elsewhere in the essay, we learn about
American advisors to ARVN forces.' 6 We know that many ARVN units at
the time were accompanied by American advisors. 17 Did an American advi-
sor accompany the ARVN troops on this mission? If so, where was he when
the torture began? Did he, as happened in so many veteran accounts from
that war, go off to have a cigarette, or given the duration of the interroga-
tion, a pack of cigarettes, at the ARVN commander's suggestion? 18 We also
know that the ARVN forces were transported to and from the village by
helicopter. ' 9 At the time, while there were ARVN helicopter units in Viet-
nam, the likelihood that ARVN pilots rather than U.S. pilots were involved
in the mission is remote, at best.20 Did American helicopter pilots land from
time to time during the interrogation to resupply the ARVN troops? We do
know from Okamura's account of his experiences in Vietnam that after an
unsuccessful interrogation, the forty-three prisoners were transported on
American helicopters to a military area in the rear.2' What did the American
helicopter crews make of their beaten and damaged passengers and what of
the reception that they met when deposited in the rear, doubtless for a con-
tinuation of their interrogation? Were they shocked by what they saw, or
had they seen it all before? Certainly, the American officer who joined
Okamura at the base camp's officer's club, where he tried to drink the im-
15 GEORGE C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM,
1950-1975 94-100, 130-33 (3d. ed. 1996).
16 LIFE, supra note 3, at 40-44.
17 HERRING, supra note 15, at 95-98.
18 See, e.g., Robert Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr. How-
ard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 839, 915 (1994) (recounting the court-martial testimony of
Donald Duncan and Robin Moore regarding the typical American response to acts of torture
committed by their South Vietnamese counterparts).
19 LIFE, supra note 3, at 39, 44a-44c.
20 At the time, there were few South Vietnamese helicopter pilots, and they were poorly
trained. Several U.S. Marine and Army helicopter units were in Vietnam for this sort of duty.
My intuitions are shared by Professor George Herring who suggested that the most one
would see in 1964 is an ARVN trainee flying with an American helicopter pilot. Conversa-
tion with George Herring, Professor Emeritus, Univ. of Ky. (Jan. 24, 2006).
21 OKAMURA, supra note 10, at 228.
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ages away later that night, did not seem surprised as he toasted Okamura's
scoop and said: "War is meaningless. 22 What, in other words, was the rela-
tionship between Americans in Vietnam and the practice of torture by
ARVN forces? Was it awareness, accommodation, acquiescence, or encour-
agement? Did we see these acts as a beneficial evil? To what degree were
we implicated in these acts?
I do not know whether then young George W. Bush saw the photo-
graphs in Life Magazine, let alone what questions he may have pondered if
he did. It seems unlikely to me that if he did see the pictures, he would have
troubled himself much with the question: where are the Americans? After
all, in response to publication of the Abu Ghraib photographs and accounts
of prisoner abuse that went on there, he tried to reassure America and the
world that "[t]his is not America.' '23 And, indeed, to varying degrees, I sus-
pect we all found ourselves thinking that-and would have been even more
prone to think that way in 1964.
It is useful to think about extraordinary rendition as part of a larger
story about how Americans have seen their relationship to torture and to
other wartime atrocity. That relationship, and our self-perception, has been
complicated. Sometimes the ferocity of our rhetoric has been shocking, and
we have been quite sanguine in embracing the brutality of war. At times,
including, I believe, today, we have characterized the wars we fight as "sav-
age wars," fought against an enemy that we see as peculiarly barbaric and
bent on extermination to whom, we say, we must respond in kind.
More typically, however, we think of our relationship to torture and
atrocity very differently. We have a hard time seeing ourselves in the pic-
tures from Abu Ghraib, or imagining ourselves as the perpetrators of torture,
abuse, and other atrocities in the more hidden corners of the world that have
not been penetrated by digital cameras. The grinning face of Lyndie Eng-
land, is not, we tell ourselves, the face of America. This flight from the un-
seemly side of American warfare is not new. The predominant theme in our
thinking about our place in the world has been one of American exception-
alism and American innocence.24 To be sure, this image is not an altogether
flattering one. As I will suggest later on, "innocence" connotes both blame-
lessness and naivet6. Yet, I believe it is the more positive version of this
22 id.
23 Interview by Alhurra Television with President George W. Bush, supra note 1, at 787.
24 One should, of course, venture cautiously when suggesting that Americans agree on a
master narrative about ourselves. Surely, differences of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and
experience militate against any consensus. Most recently, the divisions within the U.S. re-
garding the Iraq War suggest that a strong counter narrative exists. Nevertheless, with the
caveat that these notions of American exceptionalism and American innocence do not enjoy
unqualified universal acceptance, it is fair to say that these themes play a recurring role in
how we have depicted ourselves in both popular culture and official proclamation.
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image that we usually adopt, and in so doing, we cloud our self-perception,
sometimes to the point of self-delusion.
The sad fact is that our relationship to torture and other atrocities is
more complicated and less innocent than we or President Bush would like to
believe. This article examines that relationship and the ways in which we try
to distance ourselves from torture and atrocity. Part II briefly explores our
notions of exceptionalism and innocence. Part III then turns to our efforts to
evade responsibility for torture and atrocity. First, it briefly discusses ways
in which we try to deny our own acts of torture and abuse through rhetorical
misdirection and by relegating torture to the shadows. Part III's primary
focus, however, is on our practice of "othering" torture, and on extraordi-
nary rendition as an instantiation of that practice. The second portion of Part
III looks at instances where we have taken advantage of a division of labor
in which others act as our torturers, or at least torture with our knowledge
and acquiescence, and it situates extraordinary rendition in that practice.
Finally, it looks at some of the consequences of othering torture. Part IV
takes up the theme of innocence, once again. It is commonplace to hear
these days that America "lost its innocence" on September 11, 2001. Part IV
briefly examines this notion of loss of innocence.
II. A NEW ADAM IN A NEW WORLD
Our age is retrospective. It builds the sepulchres of the fathers. It writes
biographies, histories, and criticism. The foregoing generations beheld
God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we
also enjoy an original relation to the universe?... [W]hy should we grope
among the dry bones of the past ?... There are new lands, new men, new
thoughts. Let us demand our own works and laws and worship. 
25
From early in our history, America has known war and the atro-
cious acts that accompany it. Those experiences have colored our under-
standing of ourselves in times of peace and war. So too, has our sense of
America as a place for new beginnings, a new Eden. Both of these aspects
of our collective self-image have contributed to the way we think about our
relationship to torture and atrocity.
As Richard Slotkin, Richard Drinnon, and John Hellmann have so
ably described, we have often drawn on frontier myths, including myths of
western gunfighters and "savage Indians," in understanding our confronta-
tion with other people and other parts of the world, especially when that
confrontation is tinged with racial difference.26 Confronted with an enemy
25 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
186, 186-87 (William H. Gilman ed., 1965) (1836).
26 See generally RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING
AND EMPIRE-BUILDING (1980); JOHN HELLMANN, AMERICAN MYTH AND THE LEGACY OF
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that we characterize as barbaric, we justify the waging of "savage war," a
war whose ultimate logic is not merely defeat, but extermination of the en-
emy.27 As John Dower has shown in his study of American images of the
Japanese and Japanese images of Americans during WWII, there is much
projection and self-justification at work when we employ these demonizing
myths.2 8 Confronted with a savage enemy in a non-traditional war, "a new
kind of war" we are apt to say, though little is actually new, we look to the
unconventional warrior (the frontier hero, or in his modem inception, Spe-
cial Forces and the CIA), the person who we say knows how to "fight[] like
the Indians."' 9
We have not always been squeamish about torture. In the aftermath
of the Spanish-American War, American imperial aspirations ran into a
nationalist insurrection in the newly-conquered Philippines. 30 Fueled by a
cult of masculinity, Theodore Roosevelt's call for the strenuous life, and the
desire for empire, many Americans embraced the use of torture and other
atrocious acts.31 Roosevelt explicitly linked the responsibility of Americans
to the nation and to "the race" with the imperial program in Cuba, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and he derided "those who make a pre-
tense of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity, and who cant
about 'liberty' and the 'consent of the governed,' in order to excuse them-
selves for their unwillingness to play the part of men. 32
Against this backdrop the rhetoric of pro-war advocates drew on the
trope of "savage war" to justify extreme, brutal, and sometimes extermina-
VIETNAM (1986); RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: THE MYTH OF THE FRONTIER IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1992) [hereinafter SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION];
RICHARD SLOTKIN, REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN
FRONTIER, 1600-1860 (1973); RICHARD SLOTKIN, THE FATAL ENVIRONMENT: THE MYTH OF
THE FRONTIER IN THE AGE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION 1800-1890 (1985).
27 For a discussion of savage wars, see SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at
10-13, 106-22. On the Vietnam War as a savage war, see Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 915-
21.
28 See generally JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE
PACIFIC WARpassim (1986).
29 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighters and Green Berets: The Magnificent Seven and the Myth of
Counter-Insurgency, 44 RADICAL HIST. REv. 65, 75 (1989).
30 SLOTKIN, supra note 26, at 106-22. For a discussion of the United States' policy in the
Philippines during this period, see generally LEON WOLFF, LITTLE BROWN BROTHER: How
THE UNITED STATES PURCHASED AND PACIFIED THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AT THE CENTURY'S
TURN (1961).
31 Stuart C. Miller, Our Mylai of 1900: Americans in the Philippines Insurrection,
TRANSACTION, Sept. 1970, at 19; SLOTKIN, supra note 26, at 106-22.
32 Theodore Roosevelt, Speech before the Hamilton Club: The Strenuous Life (Apr. 10,
1899), reprinted in THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE STRENUOUS LIFE: ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 18
(1902).
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tionist measures. The war correspondent for the Philadelphia Ledger, for
instance, wrote:
The present war is no bloodless, fake, opera bouffe [sic] engagement. Our
men have been relentless; have killed to exterminate men, women, chil-
dren, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people, from
lads of ten and up, an idea prevailing that the Filipino ... was little better
than a dog .... Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to "make
them talk," have taken prisoner people who ... peacefully surrendered,
and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show that they were even
insurrectos, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to...
float down as an example to those who found their bullet-riddled corpses..
. It is not civilized warfare, but we are not dealing with civilized people.
The only thing they know and fear is force, violence, and brutality, and we
give it to them.33
Taking the logic of savage war to its extreme, war correspondent
Henry Loomis Nelson argued that the United States must set aside all
qualms about cruelty or extermination.34 Loomis wrote: "We exterminated
the American Indians, and I guess most of us are proud of it, or, at least,
believe the end justified the means; and we must have no scruples about
exterminating this other race standing in the way of progress and enlight-
enment if it is necessary. ' 35 This tough-minded, bloodthirsty rhetoric trans-
lated into a brutal reality that included mass killings and torture. Thus, while
Roosevelt publicly insisted that only insurgents committed atrocities in the
Philippines, privately he welcomed the use of the "water cure, '36 that war's
version of waterboarding. Public acknowledgment of our use of the water
cure and other "inhuman conduct" came in William Howard Taft's testi-
mony to Congress on the conduct of the war. Then Governor-General of the
Philippines, Taft excused these excesses as necessary components of what
he deemed a war "between superior and inferior races."
37
In contrast to the claim to national adulthood as a world power, just
as capable of brutality in the name of empire as our European rivals, we
have often presented ourselves as free from the tyrannical tendencies and
oppressive behaviors of Europe. Patrick Henry's statements at the Virginia
ratifying convention, that he feared that we would adopt European practices
33 SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 113 (quoting a correspondent of the
Philadelphia Ledger).
14 Id. at 112.
35 SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 112 (quoting Henry Loomis Nelson).
36 Id. at 120-21.
17 Id. at 120.
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of extracting confessions by torture and of inflicting "cruel and barbarous
punishment" is but one expression of our collective sense of difference.
3 8
Americans have long seen the American experience as one of new
beginnings and an escape from the superstitions, prejudices, and practices of
Europe. We have described the United States as a new Eden or a new Israel,
and ourselves in Adamic terms. The American, in Cr~vecoeur's famous
formulation, was a "new man, who acts upon new principles., 39 The Ameri-
can was neither of the effete metropolis, nor of the frightening and uncivi-
lized (in Puritan descriptions, Satanic) wilderness. Rather he was a civiliz-
ing force in a new land, unblemished by the many faults of the old one. We
have cultivated the contrast with Europe. We are a land with no castles or
kings. In fleeing Europe, we left behind feudalism and aristocracy, the
priestcraft and religious wars. With them, we also rejected the Star Cham-
ber, the rack and the thumbscrew. So, at least, goes part of our national
myth.
The power of this notion of American exceptionalism can be seen in
its recurrence in our self-descriptions. During the American Renaissance of
the 1840s and 1850s, such writers as Emerson and Whitman viewed the
American in Adamic terms.4 0 A century later, these images of the American
Eden and of the American as a new man who had slipped the bonds and
prejudices of Europe informed the consensus school of American history.
Such historians as Daniel Boorstin, Louis Hartz, Richard Hofstadter, and
David Potter, emphasized American difference and contended that our his-
tory was unlike Europe's. 4I The struggles that marked European history
were largely missing in the United States, they argued, because class
boundaries were fluid and class distinctions were of minor import, because
ours was a nation of relative wealth, because there was a broad consensus
on basic democratic principles, eliminating the need for many of the epoch
struggles in the European past, and because political differences were con-
fined to narrow manageable issues, not the sorts of things over which people
would take to the streets and erect barricades, never mind engage in a reign
of terror. Reacting to our encounter with European fascism and commu-
nism, and to our Cold War anxieties, some of their contemporaries hope-
fully and prematurely proclaimed "the end of ideology," just as their intel-
lectual descendants would be moved to announce the "end of history"--
38 DEBATES, supra note 2, at 447.
39 J. HECTOR ST. JOHN CREVECOUER, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 50 (Doubleday
1963) (1782).
40 See generally R.W.B. LEWIS, THE AMERICAN ADAM 13-53 (1955).
41 Representative works include, DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1953); LOuIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1948); DAVID M.
POTTER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER (1954).
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equally prematurely. 42 And, of course, notions of American exceptionalism
are very much at the core of our current approach to foreign policy, not-
withstanding our claims to be participating in the "coalition of the will-
ing."43
At the center of this idea of the new American is a notion of Ameri-
can innocence. By leaving Europe, Americans, our national story tells us,
freed themselves from the corruption of Europe. We were reborn innocent.
As I will suggest later on, this image has not always been a flattering one.
Innocence can connote both blamelessness and naivetd. Yet, generally, it is
the former that we mean when we talk of ourselves in terms of innocence.
We are Billy Budd about to have our first experience with evil.
From time to time, our assertions of innocence collide with revela-
tions of not so innocent behavior. In such moments, we may struggle briefly
with the contradictions, but, typically, we quickly seek shelter in comforting
assertions that what we have seen is the aberration of "a few bad apples.""
In his response to the breaking news of prisoner abuse and torture at Abu
Ghraib, President Bush both condemned the behavior, and was quick to
assert that Abu Ghraib was aberrational. We stand, after all, for freedom.
Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the revelations of the My Lai mas-
sacre, in the face of the vivid photographs of dead civilians, there was wide-
spread denial that the massacre occurred, or that we could have possibly
been involved. The authors of a study on the American response to the news
of My Lai captured this reaction in their title: It Didn't Happen and Be-
sides, They Deserved It. 45 Today My Lai is forgotten by many and has
never been heard of by many too young to have forgotten it. And once again
we think ourselves innocent.
42 See generally DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL
IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES (1960); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN
(1992); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS (1960).
43 Steve Schifferes, US Names "Coalition of the Willing", BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar., 18,
2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm.
44 See DANNER, supra note 11, at 27 (describing the "'few bad apples' argument,
long the classic defense of states accused of torture" as the Bush Administration's
"master narrative" of Abu Ghraib); Johanna McGeary, Pointing Fingers, TIME,
May 24, 2004, at 44.
4' Edward M. Opton, Jr. & Robert Duckles, It Didn't Happen and Besides, They Deserved
It, in CRIMES OF WAR 441 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1971).
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III. HIDING TORTURE AND PROCLAIMING INNOCENCE
"The United States ofAmerica does not torture. ",46
Today, we have more restrained sensibilities than our forbears did
during the suppression of the Philippines insurrection. The world's collec-
tive distaste for such atrocious techniques is reflected in the Geneva Con-
ventions, and the conventions on human rights and torture.47 America's
public enthusiasm for torture is largely limited to such fantasies as the tele-
vision drama 24 and the musings of some law professors on ticking time
bomb scenarios.48 Nevertheless, torture and abuse continue to be a part of
our world, and in the "Global War on Terror" America commits, condones,
and acquiesces in such acts. The two sections that follow examine the ways
in which we try to distance ourselves from torture even as we are responsi-
ble for it.
A. What Happens in Bagram, Stays in Bagram
We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will. We've got
to spend time in the shadows in the intelligence world A lot of what needs
to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion, using
sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if
we're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in, and
so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically,
to achieve our objective.4 9
While we may never know the extent of authorized torture that we
have employed in the wars against Al Qaeda and Iraq, we have seen suffi-
46 Press Release, White House, President Tours Border, Discusses Immigration Reform in
Texas (Nov. 29, 2005).
47 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
H/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
48 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT AND RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131-63 (2002) (advocating regulated use of
torture pursuant to a court ordered torture warrant in so-called ticking bomb scenarios).
49 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (featuring Vice President
Richard Cheney).
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cient glimpses to know that torture done by Americans in the name of
America is not simply the excesses of "a few bad apples." 50 Because it takes
us far afield from extraordinary rendition, I will only touch briefly on some
of the ways that the United States has attempted to distance itself from its
own acts of torture and abuse. 5' In recent years these efforts have included
redefinitions or crabbed definitions of the word torture, 52 delegation to off-
the-books agents, whether private contractors or the CIA, 53 and relegating
our prisoners to jurisdictional netherworlds as ghost detainees, or as "enemy
combatants," or to places, such as Guantanamo, where we assert that the
U.S. Constitution and the courts do not reach.54 Recent revelations that the
CIA maintained secret prisons in Eastern Europe not only suggested that the
so-called "new Europe" 55 may not have abandoned the facilities or tech-
niques of its Warsaw Pact past, but gives a small glimpse of what is widely
assumed to be a network of secret prisons.56 There, in the shadows, beyond
the reach of international humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross,
and beyond the notice and attention of Americans, America's captives in the
War Against Terror are left to the mercy of apparently unaccountable
American civilian or military forces. Disappeared to nowhere, some of our
prisoners simply cease to exist, and one cannot torture a ghost. While some
50 See DANNER, supra note 11, at 27.
5' For a discussion of a variety of techniques employed by states to hide or deny their
responsibility for "state crime," that similarly sees this distancing as at least partly a process
of "othering," see Ruth Jamieson & Kieran McEvoy, State Crime by Proxy and Juridical
Othering, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 504 (2005).
52 See, e.g., Bybee Memorandum, supra note 11. The Bush administration ultimately
renounced the definitional limits of the Bybee Memorandum, but has continued to evade
acknowledging that techniques such as waterboarding or the use of stress positions constitute
torture.
53 On the CIA and torture, see generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 20-37 (2006).
54 The United States Supreme Court rejected at least the strong version of this claim in
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base in
Cuba are not beyond the reach of habeas corpus relief). The White House position appears to
be that the U.S. Constitution similarly only has limited reach into the Oval Office. For a
discussion of torture at Guantanamo, see SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE
ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB 1-14 (2004); Jane Mayer, The Experiment, NEW YORKER,
July 11, 2005, at 60. For a discussion of both Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, and the relation-
ship between the two, see DANNER, supra note 11, at 26-48.
55 In January 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld criticized France and Germany
for their opposition to U.S. policy. He dismissed them as belonging to "old Europe" in con-
trast to former Warsaw Pact countries that supported U.S. policy. Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of
Def., U.S. Dep't of Def., Briefing at the Foreign Press Center (Jan. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tO 1232003_t 0122sdfpc.html.
56 RISEN, supra note 53, at 29-37; Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Pris-
ons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
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of these maneuvers have come to light, 57 in an administration that is ob-
sessed with secrecy, there is no way of knowing the extent to which we
have hidden instances of torture and abuse.
In addition to these well-publicized efforts to distance ourselves
from our own acts of torture and abuse, one other recent revelation, which
has not gained the same level of press attention merits mention, in part be-
cause of its echoes of similar practices during the Vietnam War. This is the
practice of instructing American military personnel in the techniques of
torture with a nod and a wink in the guise of teaching resistance to interro-
gation.
In his 1967 critique of American militarism and of the Green Beret,
The New Legions, former Green Beret Sergeant Donald Duncan describes
the training that he both received and later gave in torture techniques.5
Duncan acknowledges that Special Forces doctrine favored psychological
methods over physical methods for interrogations. 59 Nevertheless, he ar-
gues, Green Beret training also signaled that in some instances resort to
physical methods was appropriate.6 ° In his book, he recounts the following
exchange between an instructor and a trainee:
"Sergeant Lacey, the name of this class is 'Counter-measures to Hostile
Interrogation,' but you have spent most of the period telling us there are no
counter-measures. If this is true, then the only reason for teaching them, it
seems to me, is so that we'll know how to use them. Are you suggesting
we use these methods?"
The class laughs, and Lacey looks down at the floor, creating a dramatic
pause. When he raises his head, his face is solemn but his deep-set eyes
are dancing. "We can't tell you that, Sergeant Harrison. The Mothers of
America wouldn't approve." The class bursts into laughter at the sarcastic
cynicism. "Furthermore," a conspiratorial wink, "we will deny that any
such thing is taught or intended." 61
57 Priest, supra note 56.
58 DONALD DUNCAN, THENEW LEGIONS 156-61 (1967).
'9 Id. at 156-57.
60 Id. at 156-61.
61 Id. at 159. This practice of teaching torture techniques under the cover of teaching resis-
tance to torture or techniques "to avoid" appears to be widespread. For example, during the
1960s and 1970s, students at the American-run International Police Academy wrote essays
on torture that in some instances embraced its use. They also were shown a film on improper
interrogation techniques. MICHAEL McCLINTOCK, INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT: U.S.
GUERILLA WARFARE, COUNTER-INSURGENCY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, 1940-1990 193-96
(1992). For a discussion of a similar practice among British special forces troops in Northern
Ireland, where in addition to the official rules, special forces followed the unwritten "'big
boys' rules," see Jamieson & McEvoy, supra note 51, at 508-09.
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U.S. Army interrogators who served in Vietnam tell a similar ac-
count of what James Gibson has described as a "dual structure" in their cur-
riculum. 62 Their "legal education" taught from the official manuals was
coupled with "an illegal education taught orally by instructors. 63
Recent revelations about interrogation practices at Guantanamo Na-
val Base indicate that detainees are similarly suffering abuse that is a prod-
uct of training originally designed to help American servicemen and ser-
vicewomen resist interrogation and torture. Journalist Jane Mayer writes
that psychologists associated with the "Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and
Escape" (SERE) training program taught at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
have tried to "reverse-engineer" the SERE program, in order to devise
methods to help place Guantanamo detainees under sufficient stress to break
them.64 Mayer notes that many of the coercive techniques employed at
Guantanamo are similar to those used in SERE training.65 While SERE
training clearly is intended for its stated purpose, unlike the training de-
scribed by Duncan during his Green Beret days, under the cover of the
SERE program, its teachings have taken on a more pernicious use.66
B. Othering Torture
"[After declining to eliminate a group of prisoners, we were later told by
base camp that] you wouldn't have to do it; all you had to do was give
them over to the Vietnamese."-67
"Khong, danh cho co "
"If they are not guilty, beat them until they are. "68
1. The Division of Terror in Vietnam
The Vietnamese were not the only perpetrators of torture during the
Vietnam War. While official American military policy did not encourage
torture, American interrogators sometimes used physical coercion and en-
gaged in other abusive tactics, without sanction or disapproval.69 While
some returning veterans may have exaggerated or fabricated their stories of
torture, abusive conduct, and murder of prisoners, there are too many ac-
62 JAMES W. GIBSON, THE PERFECT WAR: TECHNOWAR IN VIETNAM 183 (1986).
63 Id. at 183-85.
64 Mayer, supra note 54, at 63-64.
65 Id. at64.
66 See id. at 67.
67 Donald Duncan, "The Whole Thing Was a Lie! ", 4 RAMPARTS 12,21 (1966).
68 Saigon police slogan, quoted in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL PRISONERS IN
SOUTH VIETNAM 27 (1973) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
69 GIBSON, supra note 62, at 182-87. The enemy also used torture and terror techniques.
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counts of such behavior to deny that sometimes American soldiers and ma-
rines tortured their Vietnamese prisoners. Veterans who testified at the Win-
ter Soldier Investigation, organized by Vietnam Veterans against the War,
and at the Congressional hearings on war crimes, organized by Congress-
man Ron Dellums, gave ample examples of a wide array of torture practices
and techniques including, beatings, threatened rapes, water torture, electric
shocks to the genitals and other parts of the body, and locking prisoners in a
room to spend the night with a python.7°
Typically, however, it was not American servicemen who tortured
7 72
or killed prisoners.7 1 That task was left for the Vietnamese. The wide-
spread practice was for Americans to turn over prisoners to the ARVN or to
the National Police, knowing that the prisoners were almost certain to be
tortured and possibly killed.73 Objecting to this practice, Peter Hamill
wrote:
The fact is that American soldiers-who are now doing almost all of the
fighting-are violating the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War every day. It is a violation for soldiers of one army to
turn over prisoners of war to soldiers of another army. And that is pre-
cisely what we do.
Every correspondent in Vietnam knows this, and has seen it for himself.
An American unit will move into a village, or an area, and round up every
male. A South Vietnamese liaison officer will then interrogate each man,
and if he believes the man is a Viet Cong guerilla, or even a sympathizer,
the man will be taken off to a detainment camp. After detailed interroga-
tion, he is usually executed.
74
70 THE DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM: AN INQUIRY INTO
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 83-156 (Citizens' Comm'n of Inquiry eds.,
1972) [hereinafter DELLUMS COMMITrEE HEARINGS]; see also VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST
THE WAR, THE WINTER SOLDIER INVESTIGATION: AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICAN WAR CRIMES
101-21 (1972) [hereinafter VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR]. At the time, the Nixon
administration charged that many of the testifying witnesses were never in Vietnam. Unfor-
tunately, that allegation has had considerable persistence. In fact, the Vietnam Veterans
Against the War carefully vetted their witnesses and established that they were in Vietnam
when they said they were. For a discussion of these hearings, see ANDREW E. HUNT, THE
TURNING: A HISTORY OF VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR 55-76 (1999); GERALD
NICOSIA, HOME TO WAR: A HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM VETERANS' MOVEMENT 73-93 (2001).
71 IN THE NAME OF AMERICA 66 (Seymour Melman ed., 1968).
72 See Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 914.
73 Id.; IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 66-69. The process of transferring
prisoners and their subsequent treatment is described in Orville Schell, Cage for the Inno-
cents, in WHO WE ARE 130-44 (Robert Manning & Michael Janeway eds., 1969).
74 Peter Hamill, N.Y. POST, July 22, 1966, quoted in IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note
71, at 66-67.
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The practice of transferring prisoners of war to another country's
control without determining that the receiving country will abide by the
Geneva Convention's provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war
violates that Convention.75 Nevertheless, the practice of transfer, and the
consequences for the prisoners was well known both to the American mili-
tary and to those who cared to notice in the United States. Certainly by
1965, if not earlier, the U.S. press had frequently described the torture prac-
tices of ARVN interrogators.76 The following year, Ohio Senator Stephen
Young protested the practice on the Senate floor. Nevertheless, Americans
continued to transfer prisoners to their Vietnamese counterparts and to ob-
serve the torture of those prisoners throughout the war. 78
American servicemen tended to argue that they could not protest
without risking retaliation or harm to their military careers.79 In fact, little
evidence exists of any such retaliation.8" Americans also argued that protest
would be futile and would only have the effect of alienating their Vietnam-
ese ally.81 In response to this argument, journalist Malcolm Browne wrote:
I must observe here that if the United States ever had had a really serious
objection to the torture of Viet Cong prisoners, the practice could have
been swiftly halted. On the one hand, the United States dominates Viet
Nam's armed forces, and on the other, it contends it has no control over
such matters as the torture of prisoners. 82
In fact, American military doctrine relied on the South Vietnamese
to engage in torture, abuse, and murder. It was more than just a convenience
75 Geneva III, supra note 47, art. 12.
76 See, e.g., MALCOLM W. BROWNE, THE NEW FACE OF WAR, 195-202 (rev. ed. 1968);
Lloyd Garrison, US. Tries to Curb Vietnam Torture, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1965, at 2.; Neil
Sheehan, Vietnam: The Unofficial Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1965, at 4; IN THE NAME
OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 58-90, 110-16 (collecting newspaper articles and other
sources). Indeed, in a New York Times article from November 1963, which focused primar-
ily on the torture of political prisoners under the Diem regime, the author said of the use of
electric shocks in torture, that "[m]any United States military advisers and foreign newsmen
have seen variations of this torture applied to Vietcong suspects in the field." Political Pris-
oners in Vietnam Tell of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1963, at 4.
77 IN THE NAME OF AMERICA, supra note 71, at 66.
78 See, e.g., DELLUMS COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 70, at 85-90 (testimony of SP/5
Nathan Hale) (describing hanging and beating of prisoners in the presence of Americans);
DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 180-82 (describing incident where frustrated Vietnamese interro-
gator cut the gall bladder out of a prisoner as U.S. Special Forces looked on); VIETNAM
VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR, supra note 70, at 101-05 (testimony of SP/4 Steve Noetzel)
(describing ARVN guards throwing prisoners out of helicopters in flight).
79 See Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 914.
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 BROWNE, supra note 76, at 198.
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for the Vietnamese to do much of the dirty work of harsh interrogation. Nor
was it simply a matter of taking advantage of the knowledge of language
and culture that the Vietnamese had. Donald Duncan recalls that his instruc-
tors in countermeasures to interrogation taught:
When you are in a foreign country as part of a guerrilla organization, you
will not be doing the interrogating. Your job is to teach the various meth-
ods of interrogation to your indigenous counterpart. It would be very bad
form for you, as an outsider, to do the questioning-especially if it gets
nasty. The forces opposing your guerillas will probably be a native, be the
same color, have the same religion. If you display a willingness to harm
the natives, even though they are the enemy, it could be misunderstood by
your guerrillas as prejudice. The indigenous guerrilla leader must believe
that the idea for a course of action comes from himself; your control must
be by suggestion. 83
What is at work here is what I have elsewhere described as a "divi-
sion of terror.",84 American forces largely limited themselves to "'legal'
terrors [such] as free fire zones, napalm, white phosphorous, defoliation,
fragmentation bombs," relocations of populations to strategic hamlets, and
dropping more tonnage of bombs than we had in World War 11.85 We
mostly left to our Vietnamese counterparts unseemly terrors, such as kid-
napping and assassination, and "torture and murder of prisoners." 86 In so
doing, we were not "helpless onlookers," but beneficiaries of their actions.87
The Vietnamese were not oblivious to the hypocrisy involved. One Viet-
namese officer said to Malcolm Browne:
"You don't like the methods we apply to prisoners and the way we do
business in the field .... But you have nothing against the use of artillery
barrages, and air strikes using heavy bombs and napalm. Have you ever
visited a hamlet hit by napalm after your planes have finished?"
88
Torture carried out on the field, or back at the base in the immediate
aftermath of a battle or a sweep through a village where often peasants were
indiscriminately rounded up for interrogation, was only a small part of the
routine of torture practiced by the Vietnamese. Torture was also widely
used by the National Police against those deemed to be political threats to
the various Vietnamese regimes that governed during our involvement there
83 DuNCAN, supra note 58, at 159.
84 Strassfeld, supra note 18, at 919.
85 id.
86 id.
87 id.
88 BROWNE, supra note 76, at 200.
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and to determine whether arrestees posed a threat to the government.8 9
While typically the government classified these prisoners as suspected
communists, one could land in a South Vietnamese prison for any number
of reasons ranging from being a Buddhist, especially during the Diem re-
gime, to "neutralism," to participating in a student demonstration or a peace
demonstration, to offending a neighbor or Village Chief who then sought
revenge by identifying you as part of the National Liberation Front infra-
structure under the Phoenix Program.
90
A 1973 Amnesty International report noted that the "United States
[was] intimately involved in the funding and training of the [National] po-
lice" and, therefore, deeply implicated in the imprisonment and torture of
political prisoners throughout our involvement in Vietnam.9' The training
and expansion of the National Police was largely a project of the Office for
Public Safety of the Agency for International Development. 92 At least in
some instances, that training appears to have included instruction in physi-
cally coercive interrogation techniques. 93 One Vietnamese graduate of the
American-run International Police Academy, in an essay on coercive inter-
rogation techniques entitled Three Ways of Interrogation, thanked "the
United States for having 'assisted the national police in technical and
equipments aid to help an interrogator in his interrogation of communist
prisoners to be more effective.'
94
The leaders of the coup that overthrew the Diem regime in Novem-
ber 1963 released thousands of political prisoners.95 Quickly, however, and
especially after a 1965 coup toppled the Khanh government and brought
General Nguyen Cao Ky to power, the South Vietnamese government began
to refill its jails. Though accurate numbers were hard to establish, "neutral-
ists, peace leaders, and former prisoners themselves" estimated the number
as at least 200,000 in 1970.96 Three years later, Amnesty International con-
cluded that despite the April 1973 peace treaty, which required prisoner
89 HOLMES BROWN & DON LUCE, HOSTAGES OF WAR: SAIGON'S POLITICAL PRISONERS 7-10
(1973); ALFRED HASSLER, SAIGON, U.S.A. 80-97 (1970); see also MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE
VIETNAM WARS: 1945-1990 145 (1991).
90 HASSLER, supra note 89, at 91-92, 96.
91 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 68, at 13.
92 The United States bankrolled the police force's expansion from 19,000 men in 1962
under the Diem government, to 114,000 in 1972, with plans for further expansion, and had
trained the additional men. Id. In addition to the National Police force, various other police
forces and intelligence services operated in South Vietnam.
93 See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 61, at 194-95.
94 Id. at 195 (citing Nguyen Van Thieu, Three Ways of Interrogation, Aug. 10, 1965).
95 Political Prisoners in Vietnam Tell of Torture, supra note 76, at 4.
96 HASSLER, supra note 89, at 96-7.
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release, the Saigon government was still holding at least 70,000-75,000 po-
litical prisoners and that the number might exceed 100,000 prisoners. 97
The National Police Headquarters was one of the most feared loca-
tions in South Vietnam, and the Saigon government established provincial
interrogation centers in each of its provinces. 98 United States military and
civilian personnel were deeply implicated in the prison system, with Ameri-
can advisers assigned throughout the system.
The symbol of state repression in South Vietnam became the Tiger
Cages at the prison on Con Son Island. 99 Originally built by the French,'00
the Saigon government readily adopted this symbol of French colonial rule.
The Tiger Cages were tiny overcrowded cells in a hidden part of the Con
Son prison that were open on the top to the elements and to the abuses of
prison guards.' 0 Prisoners, some sent there for refusing to salute the Viet-
namese or American flags, were malnourished, brutalized, and forced to
remain in cramped positions. 0 2 Many were permanently crippled by their
confinement in such small space, left unable to walk or to stand erect. 103
Americans learned of the Tiger Cages through the efforts of Don
Luce, an American who was working in Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services and the World Council of Churches, and a Vietnamese
college student who had recently been released from Con Son prison.'l 4
Together with Tom Harkin, then a congressional aide, they persuaded Con-
gressmen Augustus Hawkins and William Anderson to charter a plane and
investigate Con Son. 105 Armed with a map drawn by the released prisoner,
they went intent on finding the Tiger Cages. 106 Before they got to Con Son,
Frank Walton, Director of the U.S. Public Safety program in Vietnam as-
sured them the prison was not really like a prison. 107 Rather, it "is more like
a Boy Scout Recreational Camp." 0 8 Despite Walton's and the prison com-
mander's efforts to keep them from discovering the Tiger Cages, they man-
aged to find the door that the Vietnamese student had told them about and to
97 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 68, at 7-8.
98 See HASSLER, supra note 89, at 80; YOUNG, supra note 89, at 145.
99 See BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89.
'0o Id. at 36.
'o' Id. at 39-41.
102 Id. at 36.
103 Id
104 Id.; The Tiger Cages of Con Son, LIFE, July 17, 1970, at 26[hereinafter Tiger Cages].
See also Ralph Graves, Editor's Note: How They Uncovered the Tiger Cages, LIFE, July 17,
1970, at 2A.
105 Graves, supra note 104, at 2A.
106 Id; Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 26.
107 BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 36.
108 Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 29.
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cause a commotion that ultimately resulted in their getting to the Tiger
Cages.109 There they found prisoners starving and thirsty who complained
bitterly of their treatment.110 Walton's response was to berate the visitors
for "poking your nose into doors that aren't your business."' On the return
flight, another member of the Congressional delegation tried to seize the
camera with which Harkin had photographed the Tiger Cages. 11
2
The Saigon government promised to get rid of the Tiger Cages."1
3
However, the following year the United States Department of the Navy con-
tracted with a construction consortium, "Raymond, Morrison, Knudson-
Brown, Root and Jones to build 384 new 'isolation cells' to replace the Ti-
ger Cages."'"14 These new cells were two square feet smaller," 5 and far less
well ventilated then the Tiger Cages they replaced. 116 The funding for the
cells came from the U.S. Food for Peace Program, and the construction la-
bor was provided by prisoners being paid fifty-five to seventy-two cents per
week. 17 The Brown and Root components of this construction consortium
are the Brown and Root of the Haliburton subsidiary, KBR. 118 Most re-
cently, they capitalized on their expertise to build the cells at Guantanamo
Naval Base." 9
2. A Different "Vietnam Syndrome"
Americans have noted what has been described as a "Vietnam Syn-
drome" resulting from our unhappy experience in America's longest, and
least successful, war. 120 In the aftermath of Vietnam, Americans have
shown great reluctance to support military ventures involving the commit-
ment of American troops unless the war promised to be short with minimal
American casualties. Americans have also shown greater willingness to
question the motives and judgment of their government whenever it has
109 BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 38; Graves, supra note 104, at 2A.
'o Tiger Cages, supra note 104, at 26-29.
"'. Id. at 29.
112 Graves, supra note 104, at 2A.
113 BROWN & LUCE, supra note 89, at 43; Saigon is Investigating 'Tiger Cage' Cells at a
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1970, at 9; 500from Con Son Flown to Saigon, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1970, at 1.
"14 Id at 43.
115 id.
116 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 68, at 21.
117 Don Luce, We've Been Here Before: The Tiger Cages of Vietnam, HIST. NEWS
NETWORK, Apr. 4, 2005, http://hnn.us/articles/1 1001 .html; George Wald, The Other Prison-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1972, at 33.
118 Luce, supra note 117.
119 Id.
120 HERRING, supra note 15, at 307-12; YOUNG, supra note 89, at 314-16.
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engaged in saber rattling. This healthy reluctance to commit American
troops to battle has at times impeded the ability of the United States gov-
ernment to act unfettered in the world.
There is, however, a second Vietnam Syndrome that goes much less
noticed. Even as the war was being fought, members of the foreign policy
and defense establishment were second-guessing our approach to the war. 121
Ever since, revisionist accounts have adhered to the fantasy that the war was
winnable if only we had fought it differently. 122 Some of these revisionist
accounts essentially simply repeat the often expressed Vietnam-era com-
plaint that our military was "forced to fight with one hand tied behind its
back."'' 23 Others, however, suggest that a combination of a more muscular
civic action program and the CIA's Phoenix Program, which was intended
to "neutralize" the "Viet Cong infrastructure," and which resulted in the
killing of at least 20,000 supposed members of that infrastructure and the
kidnapping or arrest and torture and imprisonment of perhaps double that
number, would have resulted in victory. 1
24
As Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnson have shown, even during the
Vietnam War, voices for greater reliance on aggressive and early police
action against "subversives" suggested that the United States could further
its policy goals by assisting indigenous proxy forces, rather than by the
heavy handed, and sometimes self-defeating commitment of major military
121 See infra text accompanying notes 125-13 1.
122 The revisionist literature that contends that the war was a winnable noble cause contin-
ues to grow. Important examples include, GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM (1978);
U.S. GRANT SHARP, STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT (1978); LEWIS SORLEY, A BETTER WAR: THE
UNEXAMINED VICTORIES AND FINAL TRAGEDY OF AMERICA'S LAST YEARS IN VIETNAM
(1999); HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR
(1982); WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS (1976).
123 For an example of this mantra, see OLIVER L. NORTH & DAVID ROTH, ONE MORE
MISSION: OLIVER NORTH RETURNS TO VIETNAM passim (1993). This idea is also expressed in
the film RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II (TriStar Pictures 1985). There troubled super survivor
Vietnam veteran John Rambo (Sylvester Stallone) is sent on a mission to postwar Vietnam to
investigate rumors of captive American POWs still being held by the Vietnamese. Upon
accepting the mission, Rambo asks, "Do we get to win this time." For a discussion of the
film, see John Hellman, Rambo's Vietnam and Kennedy's New Frontier, in INVENTING
VIETNAM: THE WAR IN FILM AND TELEVISION 140-52 (Michael Andregg ed., 1991); Gregory
A. Waller, Rambo: Getting to Win This Time, in FROM HANOI TO HOLLYWOOD: THE VIETNAM
WAR IN AMERICAN FILM 113-128 (Linda Dittmar & Gene Michaud eds., 1990). For a critical
comment on the "one hand tied behind their backs" explanation of the war's outcome, see
Bob Buzzanco, 25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us from Coming to Terms
with Vietnam, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 17, 2000, available at www.commondreams.or
g/views/041700-106.htm.
124 On Phoenix, see JOHN PRADOS, LOST CRUSADER: THE SECRET WARS OF CIA DIRECTOR
WILLIAM COLBY 207-38 (2003); YOUNG, supra note 89, at 212-13; see generally JEFF STEIN,
A MURDER IN WARTIME: THE UNTOLD SPY STORY THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF THE
VIETNAM WAR (1992).
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force.1 25 Speaking to the International Police Academy in late 1965, Gen-
eral Maxwell Taylor stated:
The outstanding lesson [of Vietnam] . . is that we should never let an-
other Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing
the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young,
emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those
symptoms which, if allowed to develop unrestrained, may eventually grow
into a disastrous situation such as that in South Vietnam .... We have
learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence
organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient
subversive situation. 
126
Elaborating on this idea, Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, articu-
lated a notion of policing of dissidents as "preventive medicine."' 127 By sup-
pressing dissident organizations before they could gain significant popular
support, the United States could avoid future Vietnams. 128
In accordance with this approach, in the 1960s and 1970s AID's Office of
Public Safety worked closely with the police and paramilitary forces of
some of the most repressive regimes in the world, including Iran, Chile,
Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Indonesia. 129 Even before the creation
of the Office of Public Safety, U.S. programs provided police training to a
wide array of police forces. 130 Between 1954 and 1975, the United States
trained over 7,500 foreign police officers in the U.S. and over a million po-
lice officers abroad. 131 Obviously, many of these trainees came from non-
repressive states, but the American footprint resulting from these training
programs has also been large in authoritarian regimes. While Congress put
an end to the Office of Public Safety program in 1975, the United States has
given training and support to the agents of repressive regimes in a variety of
other ways. 
32
125 See generally MICHAEL T. KLARE & CYNTHIA ARNSON, SUPPLYING REPRESSION: U.S.
SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ABROAD (1981).
126 Id. at 19.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 19-27; Cynthia Amson, Window on the Past: A Declassified History of Death
Squads in El Salvador, in DEATH SQUADS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: MURDER WITH
DENIABILITY 85, 92-93 (Bruce B. Campbell & Arthur D. Brenner eds., 2000) (describing the
Office of Public Safety's assistance to the El Salvador regime during the 1960s).
130 EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE REAL TERROR NETWORK: TERRORISM IN FACT AND
PROPAGANDA 127 (1982).
131 Id.
132 MCCLINTOCK, supra note 61.
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In this era of globalization, torture is a global phenomenon.133 The
United States has indirectly supported torture by training and supplying the
militaries of countries that engage in torture and other repressive techniques,
and by bolstering those countries with economic support. 134 The United
States has also permitted private manufacturers to sell the implements of
torture and abuse to an array of repressive regimes. A 2003 Amnesty Inter-
national Report, The Pain Merchants found that U.S. manufacturers ex-
ported $14.7 million worth of electroshock devices and $4.4 million worth
of shackles and other restraints. 135
A particularly troubling example of American involvement in the
globalization of torture has been the operation of the School of the Ameri-
cas, now renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Coopera-
tion, which is dedicated to training Latin American soldiers. 136 Founded in
1946, though not dubbed the School of the Americas until 1963, the school
represented part of America's reaction to the Cold War and perceived
threats to stability in Latin America. 137 While many of the school's alumni
have unblemished human rights records, many other graduates have partici-
pated in human rights abuses. 138 Indeed, one commentator states that the
school's graduates "have played key roles in nearly every coup and major
human rights violation in Latin America in the past fifty years."'
139
In the 1990s, the school's use of a number of manuals that coun-
seled the use of assassination, false arrest, intimidation of families of dissi-
dents, and torture came to light. ' 40 Pentagon officials attributed the manuals
to overzealous junior officers who "simply assumed that U.S. laws against
assassination, beatings, and blackmail applied only to U.S. citizens and thus
were not applicable to the training of foreign military officers."' 14 1 In addi-
tion to manuals prepared by the military, the school used two manuals pre-
133 See Jeffrey A. Sluka, Introduction: State Terror and Anthropology, in DEATH SQUAD:
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF STATE TERROR 3 (Jeffrey A. Sluka ed., 2000) ("[I]n 1996 over half of
the world's governments were guilty of using torture on a systematic, institutionalized ba-
sis-that is, as a 'normal' mode of governance.").
114 Id. at 119-32. See generally KLARE & ARNSON, supra note 125.
135 See AMNESTY INT'L, THE PAIN MERCHANTS (2003), http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
ACT400082003ENGLISHI$File/ACT4000803.pdf.
136 Timothy J. Kepner, Torture 101: The Case Against the United States for Atrocities
Committed by School of the Americas Alumni, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 475, 476 (2001).
137 Id. at 478.
138 See id. at 476, 480-81.
139 Id. at 476.
140 Id. at 486-87.
141 Id. at 488 (citing School of the Americas Watch, Pentagon Investigation Concludes that
Techniques in SOA Manuals were "Mistakes", http://www.soaw.org/new/
article.php?id=269.
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pared by the C.I.A. 142 Both of these manuals included a chapter on coerciveinterrogation techniques.' 43
3. The Harms of Othering Torture
Recognizing the harms of torture, what are the additional harms of
othering torture? Judge Richard Posner, who argues that sometimes torture
is necessary and appropriate, suggests that a country might do best by dis-
tancing itself from its acts of torture in order to lessen the likelihood of de-
grading spillover effects on its culture. 144 Perhaps, he suggests, it is best left
to "military personnel in a foreign country."'' 45 Without accepting his under-
lying premise that it would be irresponsible for a government not to torture
under certain circumstances, one can pursue his logic an additional step. I
assume that he contemplates a country relying on its own military to torture
in a far-away place, but if distancing serves as a useful insulation, why not
delegate, or outsource, if you will, the torture to someone else?
One wrong of othering torture is that it shelters our culture only at
the cost of impairing someone else's. When we other torture, by a division
of terror, or by extraordinary rendition, we corrupt another society. When
our hireling acts out of greed or economic want, our purchase of clean
hands is a crass transaction. When, as in Vietnam, we delegate to those who
we are ostensibly there to help, our conduct is particularly cynical. We un-
dermine the very same society that we profess to be assisting, and we cor-
rupt democratic values and the rule of law while we assert that we are acting
for the noble purpose of bolstering them.
The harmfulness of othering torture goes beyond the degrading ef-
fect that it has on the people that we ask to do our dirty work. Torture by its
very nature others the victim. It reduces the victim to an object that is
wholly dependent on the whim of the torturer. It robs the victim of her dig-
nity and of her ability to act on her own behalf, turning her will into a
weapon against herself as she comes to be willing to do anything, including
condemning herself and others to make the torture stop. It degrades the vic-
tim to the point where the victim is wholly other. She may physically appear
human, but those things at the core of her humanity are no longer within her
control. 146 When torture occurs in the setting of savage war, waged against
142 Lisa Haugaard, Declassified Army and CIA Manuals used in Latin American: An Analy-
sis of Their Content, LATIN AMERICAN WORKING GROUP, Feb. 18, 1997, http://www.lawg.or
g/misc/Publications-manuals.htm.
143 Id. Excerpts from the manuals can be found at Latin American Working Group.
144 Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION
291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
41 Id. at 294-95.
146 The best starting point for an understanding of torture's effects on its victims is ELAINE
SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD 27-59 (1985).
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people who are racially or ethnically different, it reinforces the beliefs, al-
ready inculcated in the troops to ready them to fight, that the enemy is an
alien other.
By relying on Vietnamese to torture and abuse other Vietnamese,
we bolstered this sense of the Vietnamese as an alien barbaric other. Watch-
ing ARVN interrogators or National Police torture and murder helpless
prisoners, many of them hapless civilians, could only reinforce American
notions of the savagery of the Vietnamese. This, in turn, strengthened our
justification for our own savagery, for our side of the division of terror. It
reinforced the beliefs that "they" only understood force and that brutality
and torture were a part of "their" culture and therefore merely something
that we had to reluctantly, but necessarily, embrace. During the operation
that led to the destruction of the village of Ben Suc, ARVN interrogators
tortured villagers as Americans looked on. 147 Explaining it all, an American
officer said to journalist Jonathan Schell:
"You see, they do have some-well, methods and practices that we are not
accustomed to ... but the thing you've got to understand is that this is an
Asian country, and their first impulse is force .... It's the Asian mind. It's
completely different from what we know as the Westem mind ... " 148
Similarly, during that part of army dissenter Dr. Howard Levy's court-
martial, where he was permitted to raise a Nuremberg defense that U.S.
Special Forces were committing war crimes in Vietnam, the Law Officer
(the rough equivalent of a judge), Colonel Earl V. Brown, observed that
there was an "endemic" propensity toward torture and a "rather careless
attitude toward life" held by the peoples of Southeast Asia. 149 Perhaps most
infamously, General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in
Vietnam, articulated this notion when he said, "[t]he Oriental doesn't put
the same high price on life as does the Westerner. Life is plentiful, life is
cheap in the Orient. As the philosophy of the Orient expresses it, life is not
important." 150 Such sentiments constituted a blank check for savage war.
Finally, by othering torture, we fail to recognize and acknowledge
our own responsibility for what has happened to the victims. This failure to
accept responsibility gives us a dangerously distorted sense of our past and
147 YOUNG, supra note 89, at 174.
148 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Jonathan Schell).
149 Transcript of Record at 979, 1000, United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672 (1968). Cf
SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION, supra note 26, at 528-29.
150 CHRISTIAN G. mPPY, WORKING-CLASS WAR: AMERICAN COMBAT SOLDIERS AND
VIETNAM 254 (1993).
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of ourselves. 151 It also harms the victims a second time, by failing to take
seriously their memory of harm. In the case of Vietnam, this failure to ac-
cept responsibility for our actions was connected to a tendency to read the
Vietnamese out of the picture altogether. 152 In tallying the costs of the Viet-
nam War, for instance, former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara fo-
cused exclusively on the costs to the United States, despite the enormous
loss of life and resources and the enormous harm to Vietnamese economy,
society, and environment caused by the war. 153 Americans, in other words,
have often framed their understanding of the war to be a story of American
good intentions and American victimization. 1
54
The Russian roulette scenes in Michael Cimino's 1978 academy-
award-winning film, The Deer Hunter, are especially vivid instances of the
othering of atrocity and the representation of the notions of American inno-
cence and victimization. 155 One of the iconic images of the Vietnam War is
the point-blank execution of a captured and bound National Liberation
Front prisoner during the Tet offensive of 1968, by Chief of the National
Police, General Nguyen Ngo Loan. 156 General Loan's execution of this
prisoner on a Saigon street, with a pistol shot to the temple, was captured
both by still photograph and film and seen the next day by millions of
Americans. 157 As Bruce Franklin shows, Cimino clearly borrows from this
image, but in his Russian roulette scenes, he inverts the image of Loan's
execution of the prisoner.' 58 Americans, not a Vietnamese prisoner of the
American sponsored government of South Vietnam, become the victims. 159
Cimino first introduces this imagery in a scene in which captured American
151 1 discuss this failure to accept responsibility more fully in Robert Strassfeld, Robert
McNamara and the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Philippic (Or How I
Was Robert McNamara 'd into Submission) ", 47 DUKE L.J. 491 (1997).
152 See id. at 559-560.
153 On Robert McNamara's tendency to ignore the Vietnamese in his retrospective account
of the Vietnam War, see id. at 559-60.
114 See id at 559.
155 THE DEER HUNTER (Universal Studios 1978).
156 H. BRUCE FRANKLIN, VIETNAM AND OTHER AMERICAN FANTASIES 14 (2000).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 14-16 (discussing THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155). As Bruce Franklin de-
scribes, the inversion of the image of General Loan shooting a bound prisoner is but one of
several instances where Cimino takes iconic images of the Vietnam War and turns them on
their heads. Id. at 15-17. For instance, the American prisoners are kept in Tiger Cages, which
as described above, were used by the South Vietnam government, under the direction of the
same General Loan and, not by the National Liberation Front. Id. at 16.
9 Id. at 15-16 (discussing THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155).
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soldiers are forced by the enemy to play Russian roulette. 160 At the dramatic
climax of the film, we encounter a gambling den in Saigon where Vietnam-
ese, Chinese, and Caucasians who have "gone native" all wager on the
deadly game. 161 Once again, as in the earlier scene, the victim is American,
not Vietnamese.1 62 By this point, however, it is not simply a cruel enemy
who is the perpetrator. 63 The operators of the gambling den are Chinese
businessmen, and the gamblers are not North Vietnamese or National Lib-
eration Front soldiers but our "allies," the people of South Vietnam.164 The
victim, Nick, an American soldier, who survived the Russian roulette game
as a prisoner, has sunk into the depths of self-destruction as a response to
his Vietnam experience and is beyond his friend Michael's efforts to save
him.165 In Cimino's vision, Vietnam is a place where innocent Americans
go and get hurt or destroyed.
4. White Trash Talking: The "Other" America
"They weren't even pretending to get information out of them. It was rec-
reational white-trash torture." 166
"We've got some hillbilly kids out of control. " 167
Of course, we know that Americans have engaged in prisoner
abuse. Here too, however, we see a process of distancing and othering. As
of the fall of 2005, there have been over 400 criminal investigations into
allegations of detainee abuse. 168 One hundred fifty U.S. soldiers have been
subjected to non-judicial punishment for their participation in detainee
abuse, and military authorities have referred charges to courts-martial in the
cases of seventy-four other soldiers. 69 Nevertheless, press coverage has
focused overwhelmingly on two reservists, Specialist Charles Graner, Jr.,
and Private First Class Lynndie England.
160 Id. at 16 (discussing THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155). The mistreatment of American
POW's is well documented. To the best of my knowledge, however, this scene is pure fabri-
cation, as I know of no evidence that American POW's were forced to play Russian roulette.
161 THE DEER HUNTER, supra note 155.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 id.
165 Id.
166 Topic A with Tina Brown: Let the Countdown Begin, GAWKER, May 9, 2005,
http://www.gawker.com/news/media/tina-brown/topic-a-with-tina-brown-let-the-countdown-
begin-102669.php (quoting Christopher Hitchens on Abu Ghraib).
167 Senior Intelligence Official to Seymour Hersh. HERSH, supra note 54, at 362.
168 Human Rights First, Torture: Quick Facts, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/
etn/misc/factsheet.htm#_ednref7.
169 See id.
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This focus on Graner and England has conveniently allowed
Americans and the military to indulge in the "few bad apples" notion.
Moreover, the characterization of the two has fostered a process of distanc-
ing these bad apples from the rest of us. The image of Graner and England
that emerges is that of stereotypical "white trash." Lewis Lapham says of
them that they were "both looking not for a way into the halls of military
glory but for a way out of the hollows of Appalachian poverty."' 7 °
Press coverage of Graner has focused on his messy divorce, his
threats to and physical abuse of his ex-wife, and the three protective orders
necessitated by his threatening behavior. 171 His troubled work life as a
prison guard in a Pennsylvania Super Max prison, where there were allega-
tions of sadistic conduct toward prisoners, has also garnered considerable
attention; though they have regrettably not prompted much discussion of
prisoner abuse in the United States. 172
If anything, the depiction of England, dubbed "the trailer-park tor-
turer," has played into white trash stereotypes even more than those of Gra-
ner.173 Accounts typically mention her origins in a "one-stoplight town" in
West Virginia. 174 There, she grew up in a trailer park, down a dirt road from
a saloon and a sheep farm. 175 She married early and unsuccessfully and
worked for a time on the nightshift in a chicken processing plant.176 Prose-
cution witnesses described her as "undisciplined and promiscuous."'177
Partly due to her defense strategy, she is depicted as at best learning dis-
abled and speech impaired, perhaps due to oxygen deprivation at birth. 78
We are told that she was unable to speak in complete sentences until age
170 Lewis H. Lapham, Condottieri, HARPER'S MAG., June 1, 2005.
171 See, e.g., Michael A. Fuoco et al., Suspect in Prisoner Abuse Has a History of Troubles;
Whitehall Native Had Checkered Work Record, Stormy Marriage, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May
8, 2004, at Al.
172 See, e.g. ,id.; Ron Martz, President Bush Apologizes: "Sorry for Humiliation",
ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 7, 2004, at Al. For a much more nuanced treatment of Graner, see
Paul Lieberman & Dan Morain, Unveiling the Face of the Prison Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June
19, 2004, at AI.
173 Jennifer Wells, Leashes, Lynchings and Lyndie England, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 20, 2005,
at A12.
174 See, e.g., Alexandra Rocky Fleming, A Soldier, a Mother-and a Court-Martial,
PEOPLE, May 16, 2005, at 105; Ariel Sabar, Gus Sentementes & Jeff Barker, Families of the
372d Tormented by Stories of POWAbuses in Iraq, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 30, 2004, at IA.
175 Sabar et al., supra note 174; Dianne Williamson, Horrors of War Tar Women, Too,
WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, May 9, 2004, at B 1.
176 Dennis Cauchon et al., Abuse Scandal Meets Disbelief in Hometowns, USA TODAY,
May 7, 2004, at A6; Martz, supra note 172.
177 Iraqi Detainees Identify EnglandAs Their Abuser, CHIC. TRIBUNE, Aug. 6, 2004, at 10.
178 Defense Urges Leniency in Soldier's Sentencing, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2005, at A25; see
also Fleming, supra note 174.
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seven.17 9 She is variously described as either "a fool in love" easily led by
Graner or as sharing with him a taste for sexual sadism. 180
The depiction of the two gets a Jerry Springeresque twist because of
the tawdry relationship between them, complicated by a love-triangle in-
volving a third reservist at Abu Ghraib.18' We learned from the press that
among the originally unreleased Abu Ghraib photographs were pictures of
Graner's and England's sexual escapades. 182 Indeed, some of the sexually-
oriented prisoner abuse photographs were purportedly intended by Graner
as a birthday gift to England. 183 Moreover, England turned out to be preg-
nant, and she asserted that Graner is the child's father.' 84 Graner denied
paternity of the child. 185 Graner, however, spurned England and married
Specialist Megan Ambuhl, another reservist involved in the Abu Ghraib
scandal. 186
Whether or not the depictions of Graner and England accurately
capture them, the media focus on those two from amongst all the Americans
accused of prisoner abuse, reinforces the official response that the events at
Abu Ghraib were aberrational and do not represent America. Prisoner abuse
becomes the sadistic diversion of "trailer trash." Though the American faces
in the Abu Ghraib pictures may look like ours, the representation of Graner
and England allows many Americans to use class, geography, lifestyle, and
education to distance themselves from torture and abuse.
IV. THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE?
0' beautiful, for spacious skies
But now those skies are threatening
They're beating plowshares into swords
For this tired old man that we elected king
Armchair warriors often fail
And we've been poisoned by these fairy tales
The lawyers clean up all details
179 Michelle Saxton, Symbol of Prison Scandal to Plead Guilty, BERGEN CouNTY (N.J.)
RECORD, May 1, 2005, at A6.
180 Fleming, supra note 174; Cauchon et al., supra note 176; Richard A. Serrano, Female
Reservist to Plead Guilty, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2005, at A10; Defense Urges Leniency in
Soldier's Sentencing, supra note 178; Iraqi Detainees Identify England As Their Abuser,
supra note 177. See generally Martz, supra note 172.
181 See Fleming, supra note 174.
182 Robert H. Reid, New Abu Ghraib Images Aired, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at
28.
183 Graner Led Abuse atAbu Ghraib, Witnesses Testify, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2005, at C7.
184 Fleming, supra note 174.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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Since daddy had to lie
But this is the end
This is the end of the innocence187
"The age of innocence is fading like an old dream" 188
What do we mean by American innocence? As described above, it
is a notion of American exceptionalism, a freedom from the legacies of feu-
dalism and monarchy, from the constraints of history, a new start for new
men in a new land. To be sure, there are things that are unique to the
American experience, but it is a mistake to be blinded by those differences.
America's past, like the past of other countries, is hardly innocent; though
we hold onto to the trope of innocence fiercely.
Innocence can also mean naivet& We talk of the innocence of
youth. It is the state of being before learning about one's surroundings and
before confronting evil. The Americans of Henry James' novels are such
innocents, unprepared for their experiences abroad. 189 Innocence tends to
lead to the undoing of James' American protagonists. It is necessary for
them, like Adam, to experience a fall, caused by their inexperience and lack
of understanding, but in the end, the fall opens up the possibility for growth
and the beginning of understanding.'
1 90
After September 11, 2001, it became commonplace for people to
say that on that terrible date America lost its innocence. It is not altogether
clear, however, what precisely the proclaimers of the loss of American in-
nocence had in mind. Some have responded to such claims by reminding the
speakers that we have heard this all before. Just as proclamations of Ameri-
can innocence is a recurrent theme in our national self-depiction, so too are
periodic statements of the loss of innocence.' 9 1 Yet, we hear the refrain of
the loss of innocence so often that, perhaps, we need to give it some credit.
Do either of the senses of "loss of innocence" discussed above de-
scribe America in the aftermath of September 11 th? The first version of
"American innocence" grossly overstates the flawlessness of our character
187 DON HENLEY, The End of the Innocence, on THE END OF THE INNOCENCE (Geffen Re-
cords 1989).
188 IRON MAIDEN, Age ofInnocence, on DANCE OF DEATH (Columbia Records 2003).
189 See R.W.B. LEWIS, supra note 40, at 152-55.
190 Id; see also Emory Elliott, 2003 Mellon Annual Lecture at the John Hope Franklin
Humanities Institute at Duke University: National Dreams and Rude Awakenings: The
American Myths of Isolation and Innocence (Feb. 28, 2003).
191 See, e.g., Dick Crepeau, Lost and Found, POPPOLITICS.COM, Oct. 1, 2001, www.poppol
itics.com/articles/2001-10-01-innocence.shtml; Elliot, supra note 189. For a poetic expres-
sion of this idea, see Therese Baumberger, The Death of American Innocence, UNITARIAN
UNIVERSALIST ASS'N, Sept. 15, 2001, http://www.uua.org/news/2002/91102/pr ayer5.html.
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and history. The second version is quite unflattering. Is there any other way
we might meaningfully talk about loss of American innocence?
Unlike collective America, Americans do lose their innocence, es-
pecially in times of crisis and war. The literature of the Vietnam War, and
probably the literature of all wars, tells the story of innocence lost and disil-
lusionment. 192 In yet another sense, sending our young to fight often leads
to a loss of innocence. After watching her son, Paul Meadlo, a participant in
the My Lai massacre, tell his story on the CBS evening news, his mother,
Myrtle Meadlo, painfully told CBS reporter Ike Pappas:
He wasn't raised up like that .... I raised him up to be a good boy and I
did everything I could. They come along and took him to the service. He
fought for his country and look what they done to him-made a murderer
out of him, to start with. 193
Clearly in the wreckage of war, innocence is lost. Yet, that is also not what
the post-September 11 th talk of loss of innocence refers to.
Rather, our focus seems to be on a new sense of vulnerability, cou-
pled, perhaps, with a strong sense of surprise at the existence of people who
would do us harm. Here too, this "new" sense is not altogether new. One
can point to the War of 1812 and the Civil War for instances where the fate
of the Republic seemed precarious. For many, Pearl Harbor is a memory,
rather than a page in a history book. Moreover, many of us remember the
nuclear anxieties of the Cold War, anxieties that run sufficiently deep that
the Bush Administration played on them successfully in the run up to the
Iraq War. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a greater sense of vulnerabil-
ity and anxiety. Our loss of innocence is our recognition that we are not
wholly apart from the world and safe because of the buffer of two oceans.
While our sense of vulnerability is undoubtedly exaggerated, and at times
manipulated, it is also part of the current American worldview.
The question then is what we should do in the face of such anxiety?
Do we pronounce a new maturity that entails adopting a hard-nosed "gloves
are off' realism? Do we attempt to recapture our innocence by enveloping
this supposed realism in a Wilsonian missionary idealism that promises to
spread democracy throughout the world? Or do we join the world of na-
tions, not as hegemon, but as partner? If we hope to do the latter, we best
abandon torture, by proxy or otherwise.
192 See generally Appy, supra note 150.
193 MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HOURS IN MY LAI 263 (1992) (quoting Mrs. Myr-
tle Meadlo).
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V. CONCLUSION
To illustrate the concept of the division of labor, Adam Smith de-
scribes in An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations
how the process of pin making has changed.194 In a wonderful passage, he
describes the various components of pin-making and then calculates the
efficiencies gained by dividing the job into as many as eighteen different
tasks. 195 Today, law professors are again talking about pins, or at least nee-
dles, as they muse about non-lethal, but effective means of torture, and sug-
gest sterilized needles, "shoved under the fingernails," as a possible method
of torture. 196 To be sure, the connection between the contemporary discus-
sions of permissible torture techniques to Smith's insights on division of
labor is purely coincidental, not deliberate. Yet the coincidence is frighten-
ingly suggestive of the logic of extraordinary rendition. Torture by proxy,
however efficient, is still torture, no matter how many steps we remove our-
selves from the interrogation room.
Extraordinary rendition, though a recent practice, has an old history
of denial of responsibility and protests of innocence. It is anything but inno-
cent. If there is anything salvageable in the notion of American innocence,
perhaps it is in the aspiration, rather than in its mechanical assertion. In the
matter of torture, we might start by returning to Patrick Henry's admonition
with which this article began, that it is not only our past (or our myths about
the past) that matter, but what we do today.
194 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
4-5 (Random House 1937) (1776).
195 Id.
196 DERSHOWITZ, supra note 48, at 148-49.
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